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Abstract
In this paper, I present the results of an experimental study on intuitions about moral obliga-
tion (ought) and ability (can). Many philosophers accept as an axiom the principle known as
“Ought Implies Can” (OIC). If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many
philosophers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge that agents who are unable
to perform an action are not morally obligated to perform that action. The results of my
experimental study show that participants were more inclined to judge that an agent ought to
perform an action than that the agent can perform the action. Overall, participants said that
an agent ought to perform an action even when they said that the agent cannot do it. I discuss
the implications of these results for the debate over OIC.
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1 The Debate
According to the principle known as “Ought Implies Can” (OIC), if a moral
agent ought to do something, then she can do it. That is:
• (OIC) If S ought to A, then S can A.
Following the literature on OIC, I take the ‘ought’ in OIC to be a moral ought,
as opposed to a prudential, epistemic, or aesthetic ought, as in “You ought to help
others in need” (also known as “deontic” ought), but not “Little children ought to
not suffer” (also known as “optative” ought). The ‘ought’ of OIC is also an all-in
or pro tanto ought rather than a prima facie ought (Vranas 2007). I take the ‘can’
in OIC to be the ‘can’ of specific ability and opportunity, as opposed to general
ability and opportunity (Graham 2011). For example, although a kleptomaniac
might have the general ability to refrain from stealing, she lacks the specific ability
to refrain from stealing when she is in a department store and the goods are right
in front of her (Blum 2000). But if the kleptomaniac is on a deserted island, where
there is nothing to steal, she does not have the opportunity to steal (Mizrahi 2012a).
As for the ‘implies’ in OIC, I think it is the most problematic component of OIC
(Mizrahi 2009). The main candidates for the relation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ are
the following:
• Entailment: ‘S ought to A’ entails ‘S can A’.1
• Presupposition: ‘S ought to A’ presupposes ‘S can A’.2
• Implicature: ‘S ought to A’ conversationally implicates ‘S can A’.3
According to Howard-Snyder (2013), the ‘implies’ in OIC is “stronger than conver-
sational implicature, but weaker than the claim that ought implies can is true in an
uninteresting, obvious analytic way.” If entailment is too strong and conversational
implicature is too weak, then we are left with presupposition as the best candidate
for the relation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’. According to this interpretation of OIC,
a judgment about moral obligation presupposes that the corresponding judgment
about ability is true; otherwise, the former is meaningless.
Many philosophers accept OIC.4 It was even featured in the news as one of
“the greatest philosophical principles” (Baggini 2010). The problem is that OIC
“has typically been treated as an axiom” (Howard-Snyder 2013). In other words,
1See, e.g., Vranas (2007, p. 170). For arguments against entailment as the relation between ‘ought’
and ‘can’, see Sinnott-Armstrong (1988, pp. 116-120) and Mizrahi (2009, pp. 20-23).
2 See, e.g., Hare (1963, pp. 53-54). For arguments against presupposition as the relation between
‘ought’ and ‘can’, see Sinnott-Armstrong (1988, pp. 120-121) and (Mizrahi 2009, pp. 23-25).
3See, e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong (1984, p. 250). For arguments against implicature as the relation
between ‘ought’ and ‘can’, see Mizrahi (2009, pp. 26-29). See also Streumer (2003).
4For a defense of OIC, see Howard-Snyder (2006) and Vranas (2007).
Methode
issn: 2281-0498
233 Issue 6
Moti Mizrahi
many philosophers find OIC to be obviously true, and then use it to do some philo-
sophical work. For example, (Nelkin 2011, p. 5) takes “what has often been taken
to be an axiomatic moral principle, namely, the Ought-Implies-Can principle,”
and uses it to explain an “intuitively plausible” claim about an asymmetry between
blameworthy actions and praiseworthy actions.5 Even when objections are leveled
against it, OIC is usually defended by appealing to its alleged intuitiveness, which
is supposed to be elicited from hypothetical cases. For example, Graham (2011)
advances what he takes to be counterexamples to OIC, i.e., hypothetical cases in
which it seems that an agent ought to A even though she does not have the ability
and opportunity to A. Littlejohn (2012), who does not share Graham’s intuitions
about these putative counterexamples to OIC, offers a few hypothetical cases of his
own, and argues that non-consequentialists can accommodate Graham’s intuitions
about these alleged counterexamples to OIC.
Even what may be charitably construed as an argument for OIC depends heav-
ily on intuitions. For example:
I think the most natural justification for acceptance of the [OIC] maxim
is that, if it were not valid, then there could be cases in which an agent
ought to do X but cannot do X (and never could do X ). Thus, given
that if an agent ought to do X, then he would be blameworthy for not
doing X, there could be cases in which an agent is blameworthy for
not Xing and yet he cannot X. And this is objectionable—even unfair
(Fischer 2003, p. 248).
As I understand it, Fischer finds it objectionable—even unfair—to say that S
ought to A when S cannot A. Along the same lines, some defenders of OIC find it
meaningless or pointless to say that S ought to A when S cannot A (Howard-Snyder
2013). This is, in effect, what the presupposition interpretation of OIC says. That
is, if the relation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ is presupposition, then, when we tell
an agent that she ought to A, we (implicitly) presuppose that she can A; otherwise,
it would be unfair to tell her that she ought to A. Similarly, on the presupposition
interpretation of OIC, when we tell an agent that she ought to A, we (implicitly)
presuppose that she can A; otherwise, it would be meaningless or pointless to tell
her that she ought to A.
The problem, however, is that there are other philosophers who find it nei-
ther unfair nor pointless to make ought-judgments when the corresponding can-
judgments are not true. These include Saka (2000), Martin (2009), Mizrahi (2009,
5See also Rosen (2004) for an appeal to OIC in the context of a skeptical argument concerning
moral responsibility. Cf. Arpaly & Schroeder (2014, pp. 181-184). For an application of OIC in the
context of the debate over peer disagreement, see Enoch (2010). Cf. Machuca (2013, pp. 66-89).
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2012a), Jay (2013) and King (2014), to name a few of the most recent ones.6 Given
the state of the dialectics, then, it would be useful, I submit, to conduct an empir-
ical investigation that might shed new light on the debate over OIC. In particu-
lar, it would be interesting to find out whether non-philosophers are reluctant to
make ought-judgments about agents who lack ability. After all, if it is intuitive
that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’—in the sense that an ought-judgment presupposes that
the corresponding can-judgment is true; otherwise, it seems unfair or pointless to
make an ought-judgment—then we should expect competent speakers to deploy
these concepts accordingly.
This is precisely what I set out to do in this paper. In what follows, I will report
the results of an experimental study designed to test people’s intuitions about moral
obligation (ought) and ability (can). After presenting the results of the study, I will
discuss their significance for the debate over OIC. I will close with anticipating and
replying to objections.
2 The Experiment
The experiment was designed to test intuitive judgments about putative cases of
moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). To figure out whether or not people’s
intuitions align with OIC, I manipulated the following variables:
• Agent: In two of the four vignettes, the agent is a student (Nancy). In the
other two vignettes, the agent is a professor (Professor Smith).
• Circumstances: In two of the four vignettes, the agent (either Nancy or
Professor Smith) is accidentally locked inside a room before a scheduled ap-
pointment. In the other two vignettes, the agent (either Nancy or Professor
Smith) simply forgets to show up for a scheduled appointment.
In order to independently manipulate these variables, 93 participants were ran-
domly shown one of four possible different scenarios.7 The vignettes in which the
agent is Nancy read as follows:
On Tuesday morning, Nancy talks with Sid, a fellow student, about
meeting for lunch at noon. As it turns out, however, Nancy for-
gets about her conversation with Sid later that day. After waiting for
twenty minutes and realizing that Nancy doesn’t show up, Sid leaves
6For another kind of challenge to OIC, see Feis (2014). See also Streumer (2007), Heuer (2010)
and Streumer (2010) for a related discussion concerning reasons and ability.
793 participants (51 men, 42 women; ages 19-76) were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Participants were tested online using Qualtrics survey software, and compensated 0.15$ for approxi-
mately five minutes of their time.
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the cafeteria without meeting Nancy for lunch.
On Tuesday morning, Nancy talks with Sid, a fellow student, about
meeting for lunch at noon. As it turns out, however, Nancy gets locked
in her dorm room before she can make it to the cafeteria. After wait-
ing for twenty minutes and realizing that Nancy doesn’t show up, Sid
leaves the cafeteria without meeting Nancy for lunch.
The vignettes in which the agent is Professor Smith read as follows:
On Tuesday morning, Professor Smith talks with Sid, his student,
about meeting during office hours later that day. As it turns out, how-
ever, Professor Smith forgets about having office hours that day. After
waiting for twenty minutes and realizing that Professor Smith doesn’t
show up, Sid leaves the office without meeting Professor Smith.
On Tuesday morning, Professor Smith talks with Sid, his student,
about meeting during office hours later that day. As it turns out, how-
ever, Professor Smith gets locked in his classroom before he is able to
make it to his office. After waiting for twenty minutes and realizing
that Professor Smith doesn’t show up, Sid leaves the office without
meeting Professor Smith.
After getting one of these vignettes at random, participants were then asked, on
a 5-point Agree/Disagree scale, whether they agree with the following statements
(adjusted for the appropriate vignette):
• Nancy/Professor Smith can keep her/his lunch/office appointment with Sid.
• Nancy/Professor Smith ought to keep her/his lunch/office appointment with
Sid.
The data were analyzed using a 2 (agent: Nancy vs. Professor Smith) x 2 (circum-
stances: forget vs. locked) x 2 (question: can vs. ought) mixed-model ANOVA,
with agent and circumstances as between-subjects factors and question as a within-
subjects factor. There was a main effect of question, F (1, 89) = 174.7, p < .001.
There was also a main effect of circumstances, F (1, 89) = 27.0, p < .001, but
not of agent, F (1, 89) = 3.38, p = .07. There was a circumstances by question
interaction, F (1, 89) = 11.22, p = .001, and a circumstances by agent by question
interaction, F (1, 89) = 5.0, p = .029. No other interactions were significant. See
Figure 1.
Figure 1.
Accordingly, there was a significant effect such that participants were more
inclined to judge that the agent (either Nancy of Professor Smith) ought to perform
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Figure 1: Mean intuitive ought-judgments and can-judgments.
an action (namely, keep an appointment) than they were to judge that the agent
(either Nancy of Professor Smith) can perform the action. Overall, even when
they judged that the agent (either Nancy or Professor Smith) cannot perform the
action (namely, keep an appointment), participants still judged that the agent ought
to perform the action.
3 The Lesson
What lessons, then, should we draw from these experimental results? The
main lesson, I submit, is that it is far from clear what relation, if any, is supposed
to hold between ‘ought’ and ‘can’. As we have seen, entailment is said to be too
strong and conversational implicature is said to be too weak as candidates for the
relation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ (Howard-Snyder 2013). If this is correct, then
presupposition is the best candidate for the relation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’.
But the results of my study directly challenge the presupposition interpretation of
OIC. Here is why. If ‘S ought to A’ presupposes ‘S can A’, then subjects would
find it objectionable, as (Fischer (2003), p. 248) does, or pointless, as (Griffin
1992, p. 123), does, to say that an agent ought to do something when that agent
cannot do it. As I have reported above, however, ratings for the ought question
were significantly higher than ratings for the can question. Overall, participants
agreed with ought-judgments and disagreed with can-judgments. This suggests that
participants did not find it objectionable or pointless to make an ought-judgment
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when they themselves said that the corresponding can-judgment does not hold.
To this proponents of OIC might object by claiming that “when agents know
that they cannot do what they ought to do, they often ask what they ought to
do instead” (Sinnott-Armstrong 1988, p. 113). But this objection does not save
OIC from the challenge posed by the aforementioned experimental results. For,
according to OIC, if S ought to A, then S can A. In other words, the action that S
ought to perform is supposed to be the same action that S can perform, not some
other action. After all, the principle is “If S ought to A, then S can A,” not “If S
ought to A, then S can B” (Mizrahi 2012a, p. 838).
Whenever this sort of experimental findings about issues of philosophical inter-
est are reported, a by now standard objection is to say that the intuitions of people
who are not professional philosophers (“novices”) do not carry much evidential
weight. Only the intuitions of professional philosophers (“experts”), it is claimed,
should count as evidence in philosophical debates. This is known as the “expertise
defense.”8 The expertise defense is a matter of ongoing debate and this paper is not
the place to get into this debate.9 However, if proponents of OIC were to invoke
the expertise defense, they would be appealing to authority, specifically the author-
ity of expertise,10 rather than intuitiveness, as grounds for OIC. In effect, then, the
argument for OIC would change from an appeal to intuition (roughly, “OIC is in-
tuitive; therefore, OIC”) to an appeal to the authority of expertise (roughly, “The
experts say that OIC; therefore, OIC”). Now, I have argued elsewhere that both
appeals to intuition and arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments (in
the sense that the premises of such arguments do not make their conclusions more
likely to be true or probable).11 But allow me to say why the expertise defense is
of no use to proponents of OIC in this particular case.
Even if it is granted that appeals to expert opinion sometimes succeed, accord-
ing to most theoretical treatments of arguments from the authority of expertise,
such arguments are strong only if the following conditions are met:
The first is whether the opinion put forward by the expert falls within
his or her field of competence. The second is whether the source cited
as an expert is really an expert, as opposed to being a source that was
cited on grounds of popularity or celebrity status. The third is the
question of how authoritative the expert should be taken to be. The
fourth is whether there are other experts who disagree. The fifth is
whether the expert’s opinion is consistent with any objective evidence
8On the expertise defense, see Rini (2014) and Nado (2014).
9 On the debate over the expertise defense, see Knobe & Nichols (2008, pp. 3-14), Weinberg et al.
(2010), Williamson (2011) and Mizrahi (2015).
10On various kinds of appeals to authority, see Mizrahi (2010).
11On why appeals to intuition are weak arguments, see Mizrahi (2012b, 2013a, 2014). On why
arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments, see Mizrahi (2013b).
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that may be available. The sixth is whether the pronouncement made
by the expert has been correctly interpreted (Walton 2014, p. 148).
For present purposes, the most important “critical questions,” as (Walton 1997, p.
223),
• Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source?
• Field Question: Is E an expert in the field F that A is in?
• Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
As I have mentioned above, the expertise defense is a matter of current debate,
so it is far from clear how to answer the Expertise Question and the Field Question
when it comes to expertise in making intuitive judgments in response to hypothet-
ical cases of philosophical interest. As far as the Field Question is concerned, for
instance, who are the relevant experts on OIC: ethicists, meta-ethicists, logicians,
metaphysicians? All of the above, perhaps? More importantly, the answer to the
Consistency Question is clearly a negative one. As mentioned above, although
many professional philosophers accept OIC, other professional philosophers re-
ject it. Given the dialectical circumstances surrounding OIC, then, any argument
from expert opinion for OIC would be a weak argument, given that there are pro-
fessional philosophers who reject it. In other words, since one of the conditions for
a strong argument from expert opinion is that there “is agreement among experts
in the area of knowledge under consideration” (Salmon 2013, p. 118), but there is
no agreement among professional philosophers about OIC, it follows that an argu-
ment from expert opinion for OIC is weak. For this reason, invoking the expertise
defense, and thus turning the argument for OIC from an appeal to intuition to an
appeal to expertise, is a move that fails to reconcile OIC with the experimental
results reported above.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented the results of an experimental study on intuitions
about OIC. Many philosophers accept OIC as an axiom. If the truth of OIC
is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many philosophers as an axiom, then we
would expect people to judge that agents who are unable to perform an action
are not morally obligated to perform that action. The results of my experimental
study suggest otherwise. They show a significant effect such that participants were
more inclined to say that the agent ought to perform the action than they were to
say that the agent can perform the action. Overall, even when they judged that the
agent cannot perform the action, participants still judged that the agent ought to
perform the action. I have argued that the main lesson we should draw from these
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results is that it is far from clear what relation, if any, is supposed to hold between
‘ought’ and ‘can’, given that these results directly challenge the best candidate for a
relation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’, namely, presupposition.
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